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In the previous issue (1), we addressed the concept of the 
P-value, specifically in the context of the statement by the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) published in 2016 
(2) and the 2019 thematic issue of the American Statisti-
cian (3) (by ASA) devoted specifically to this topic. Here, 
we would like to add a few further comments on the is-
sue, hoping they would be of help to readers who, being 
statistically lay-persons (like us), might not have time for 
the in-depth consideration of current developments. For 
example, a quick overview of the titles of papers accom-
panying the two ASA documents (eg, Moving to a World 
beyond “p<0.05” and similar) might lead one to assume that 
the P-value concept should be abandoned. The fact is just 
the opposite – the P-value concept has been and remains 
important for the interpretation of research results (within 
the frequentist framework). The objective of the entire ef-
fort is something else – a deviation that has occurred over 
the years resulting in a widespread perception of the P-val-
ue as an ultimate tool for dichotomization of the results 
as “significant” (typically interpreted as evidence of an ef-
fect or, commonly also, as evidence of a “practically rele-
vant effect”) or “not significant” (typically (mis)interpreted 
as evidence of no effect) based on the magic threshold 
of 0.05. The entire ASA effort is an attempt to straighten-
out this (mal)practice and to endorse (and widely ac-
cept) (more) appropriate interpretations. This “call for rea-
son” was also perfectly outlined in a statement published 
in Nature (4) and signed by more than 800 scientists. In 
the nine months since it was published, it has been cited 
160 times, illustrating the importance that the scientific 
community attaches to this issue.
The concept of the “critical P-value” has been the subject of 
extensive discussions in the statistical community from its 
very beginning, some 100 years ago. Already in the 1930s, 
Pearson had serious reservations about the threshold for 
statistical significance in the decision process (5). Yet, in 
the decades to follow, the value of 0.05 as the threshold of 
“statistical significance” (and, therefore, “evidence”) has be-
come a kind of a dogma in reasoning based on frequentist 
view on statistics. What is happening at moment is an at-
tempt to demystify it. A critical mass of statistical and other 
scientists have come together to point out the flaws and 
poor consequences of many aspects of such practice.
WHere did THe 0.05 THresHold come from?
In statistics textbooks, lectures, and courses, the value of 
0.05 is commonly referred to as the threshold of statisti-
cal significance, type I error, or “alpha”. A simplified outline 
of a typical scenario is that data (numerical values) gath-
ered through an empirical observation (experimental, 
pseudoexperimental, or any other) are processed by a spe-
cific mathematical procedure (statistical test), resulting in 
a test-statistic and the associated P-value. If P ≤ 0.05, one 
concludes that the data are not compatible with the a pri-
ori hypothesis of “no effect” (the null hypothesis, H0), and if 
P > 0.05 one concludes that the data are compatible with 
H0. That is, the P-value is considered as a tool for dichoto-
mizing the results of a test. In the former case (P ≤ 0.05), one 
concludes that H0 should be rejected; claims the test results 
to be “statistically significant,” and claims it to be evidence 
of an effect. In the latter case (P > 0.05), one concludes that 
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H0 cannot be rejected, considers the test result “not statisti-
cally significant,” providing no evidence of an effect. How 
did this 0.05 threshold come to be in the first place? The 
common (and basically correct) answer is that this “critical” 
P-value was determined arbitrarily, but with a reason.
The key paper that introduced statistical significance as 
a concept was that by Edgeworth, published in 1885 on 
the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the London Roy-
al Statistical Society (6). Edgeworth’s intention was to de-
fine a measure that would indicate whether the results of 
the research deserve further attention or can be ignored. 
While none of the Fellows of the Society “had Edgeworth’s 
taste for theory [...] they could see that he was theorising 
about something worthwhile and that he did it very well” 
(7). Other authors soon warmed to the concept, conclud-
ing that it would be even more useful to have some kind of 
an indicator that could be used to explicitly decide on the 
existence or non-existence of statistical significance (8). 
The term itself was adopted by Fisher (9), who added the 
concept of null hypothesis. Neyman and E.S. Pearson later 
extended the concept with type I and type II errors, statisti-
cal power, and, critically, with the rejection of the null hy-
pothesis in cases when the P value reached the predefined 
threshold of type I error (10-12).
But, why was the threshold set at 0.05? Karl Pearson (fa-
ther of the aforementioned E.S. Pearson), in his lectures 
at University College London, proposed that deviations 
from the mean that are greater than 3 probable errors 
were “definitely significant.” (Probable error of the mean 
(γ) should not be confused with standard deviation (σ); 
γ = 0.6746 × σ). [A comment: Pearson worked with effects 
that, as for example difference between two mean values, 
have a normal sampling distribution. The center, ie, the 
mean of the normal distribution, is 0 and values that are 
“3 probable errors” (or more) far from the mean are suffi-
ciently far from it that they could be considered extreme 
values. Hence, if an observed effect is “3 probable errors” 
(or more) far from 0, it clearly is not compatible with 0, it 
is an “extreme” or, as quoted from Pearson, “definitely sig-
nificant”]. This was embraced by Gosset (better known as 
“Student”, working in the famous Guinness Brewery and 
eventually rising to the status of a master brewer) (13). 
Later, in his seminal 1925 work, Fisher defined more pre-
cisely that the total area under the curve of the standard 
normal distribution that is below and above the mean 
±3γ was 4.56%, which he rounded to 5% (8). And thus 
0.05. The final step, however, was not made by Fisher, but 
by Neyman and E.S. Pearson. They introduced the require-
ment of a priori defining this threshold and subsequently 
basing the decision process (“decision theoretic frame-
work”) on whether the resulting P was above or below it. 
Although the feuds between Neyman and Pearson on the 
one hand and Fisher on the other were fierce and public, 
the impression among statisticians was that they agreed 
about the need to (pre)specify alpha. This fact further ce-
mented the importance of the concept of “statistical sig-
nificance” among statisticians of the time. The rest, one 
could say, is history.
examPle (anoTHer one...)
The P-value has thus become a universal parameter sep-
arating statistically significant from not significant, impor-
tant from irrelevant (to the extremes that went beyond 
reason and beyond what was the original intention). As 
Goodman (14), largely ironically, said (on the reasons why 
it is difficult to “get rid” of this kind of thinking): “When ev-
eryone believes in something’s value, we can use it for real 
things; money for food, and P values for knowledge claims, 
publication, funding, and promotion.”
There are numerous examples that illustrate the inappropri-
ateness of decision making solely based on a dichotomized 
P-value. A trivial situation – what if P is 0.049, or if P is 0.051? 
Common sense tells us that these values are basically identi-
cal. However, the “dichotomization dogma” pushes the con-
clusion toward “no effect” if P = 0.051 and toward “effect” if 
P = 0.049. Furthermore, if this threshold was set arbitrarily at 
0.05, why should it not be (also arbitrarily) set at 0.10, 0.15, 
or 0.02? In other words, what is the value of P at which one 
should “reject the null,” if such a value at all existed? In a me-
ta-analysis of the effects of aerobic exercise on blood pres-
sure (15), authors describe the results of 53 studies, noting 
that the “effect of exercise” was statistically significant only 
in a minority of 20 studies. In other words, based on an arbi-
trary set threshold of statistical significance, 20 studies point 
to the conclusion that there is a significant blood pressure 
reduction in those who exercise (an effect of exercise), while 
the remaining 33 studies find no such reduction (no effect 
of exercise). However, just an insight into the mean values 
from two of the embraced studies with such seemingly con-
flicting results illustrates the pitfalls of “threshold thinking.” In 
one study, the authors concluded that the change in systolic 
blood pressure in the exercise group (from 128.6 to 125.3 
mm Hg, ie, a reduction of 3.3 mm Hg) was statistically signif-
icantly different from the change in control pressure (from 
127.6 to 129.9 mm Hg, ie, an increase by 2.3 mm Hg, for 
an overall difference in mean change of 5.6 mm Hg) 
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(16). In another study, the authors did not find statistically 
significant differences between the exercise group (change 
in SBP from 136.6 to 130.1 mm Hg, ie, a 5.5 mm Hg reduc-
tion) and the control group (change from 134.9 to 135.8 mm 
Hg, ie, a 0.9 mm Hg increase, for an overall mean difference 
of 6.4 mm Hg) (17). Observing only the blood pressure val-
ues, ie, the effect size, it is clear that both studies point to ex-
actly the same conclusion. To imply based on the results of 
the latter study that there is no (beneficial) effect of physical 
activity on blood pressure is completely meaningless. This is 
an error commonly seen in various publications, arising from 
ignoring the effect size, results of other similar studies, and 
treating P-value as an uttermost indicator of truthfulness of 
the underlying concept. P-value is actually a measure of the 
compatibility of the observed effect with the a priori null hy-
pothesis, which communicates uncertainty about the ef-
fect: low P-values signal poor compatibility with the null and 
increase our certainty about the existence of an effect, while 
high P-values signal better compatibility with the null and 
increase our uncertainty about the existence of an effect.
so, WHaT To do? abandon P, cHange THresHold?
Should the P-value then be ignored? Definitely not. How-
ever, its interpretation should be more flexible, as opposed 
to the “all or nothing” threshold-based reasoning. In the 
above examples, in the first study P was <0.001, while in 
the second study it was 0.11. Deciding (just) based on P 
would have led us in the wrong direction, but looking at 
the effect size and placing the results in the context of oth-
er studies points to a correct conclusion. So, the correct 
question is not what metric to use instead of P, but how 
to interpret P and how to best supplement it with other 
indicators.
Some hints regarding this approach could be summarized 
as follows:
 – When postulating a scientific question or hypothesis, 
multiple studies should be used to answer one question 
(the concept of “one phenomenon, many studies”) rather 
than trying to answer many questions in a single study (the 
concept of “many phenomena, one study”) (18).
 – The data gathering process should always be evaluated 
first, eg, to try to assess to what level it has been protected 
from various types of bias and confounding – ie, to ascer-
tain that the observed effect indeed could be ascribed to 
the intervention (treatment, risk factor, diagnostic test, 
etc) studied.
 – The mathematical method used to “process the data” 
(ie, the method of effect calculation) should be appropri-
ate and reported in detail. In other words – potential bias 
arising from data gathering process and data processing 
should be minimized.
 – The P-value should be interpreted in the context of the 
sample size and the observed effect size and should be 
always reported with the estimated effect and its confi-
dence intervals (19).
 – The results should never be described solely as statisti-
cally significant or not significant based on some arbitrary 
threshold. P should be treated as a “continuum of compati-
bility with the null hypothesis,” reported accurately to three 
decimal places. It has been suggested that the wording 
“statistically significant” should be used only in conjunction 
with very low P values (<0.005) (20), ie, that the threshold 
should be reduced – but this is a matter of debate. For ex-
ample, in pivotal regulatory trials of therapeutics, which are 
all stringently conducted experiments, P < 0.05 has been 
continuously considered as a sufficient level of certainty 
about the existence of an effect – and the concept seems 
to function well.
 – The fact is that all empirical observations are done in 
samples from the population – and the only constant in 
life sciences and medicine is a great variability of the stud-
ied entities. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that all studies of 
a particular phenomenon will produce the same results. 
Results will vary, and so will the values of obtained param-
eters, statistical and otherwise. Only a shift from statistical 
inference to (much more demanding) statistical thinking 
allows us to draw the right conclusions based on a large 
amount of information.
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